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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

SUPREME COURT NO.:
46708-2019
BENEWAH CASE NO.:
CR0S-18-0546

vs.
DENISE A. GOTTLIEB,

REPLY BRIEF
Defendant-Appellant.

I. Ms.· Gottlieb's appeal should not be dismissed.
Ms. Gottlieb is not a fugitive and should be allowed to avail herself of the appellate
process because she did not abscond, flee, or avoid prosecution of the underlying criminal case.
This appeal is based on the abuse of discretion and excessive sentencing of the District Court.
Even if this Court considers Ms. Gottlieb a fugitive, the Court should exercise its discretion to
hear her appeal because the "fugitive disentitlement" doctrine does not apply.
A. Ms. Gottlieb is not a fugitive and did not abscond from justice and therefore
dismissal of her appeal is not warranted.
"Fugitive disentitlement" is an equitable doctrine that allows appellate courts to dismiss
the appeal of a defendant who flees the jurisdiction. See Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508,
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51 0 (9th Cir. 1998). "An appellate court may dismiss the appeal of a defendant who is a fugitive
from justice during the pendency of his appeal." Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S.
234, 239 (1993). As the Idaho Court of Appeals explained, "[t]he rationale for this rule is twofold. First, any judgment produced against a fugitive appellant would be unenforceable." State v.

Moran-Soto, 150 Idaho 175 (Ct. App. 2010). And second, "a defendant's escape during the
pendency of an appeal essentially amounts to a waiver of the right to appeal; dismissal
discourages escape and encourages fugitives to surrender." Id (citing Ortega-Rodriguez, 507
U.S. at 240-41). Idaho appellate courts have, in some cases, dismissed the appeal of a criminal
defendant who has absconded and remained at large during the appellate process. State v.

Larrea, 130 Idaho 290, 292 (Ct. App. 1997).
The term "fugitive" is broadly defined under federal law as it pertains to extradition of a
fugitive from one state to another. In this context, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "the
simple inquiry must be whether the person whose surrender is demanded is in fact a fugitive
from justice, not whether he [or she] consciously fled fromjustice." Appleyardv. Massachusetts,
203 U.S. 222, 227 (1906). A person who, having been charged with crime in the demanding
state, leaves that state for any purpose whatever is an extraditable "fugitive from justice" [within
the meaning of the U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2]. Reed v. Colpoys, 99 F.2d
396 (D.C. Cir. 1938), certiorari denied 305 U.S. 598.
However, a person who commits a crime in one state and subsequently moves to another
state is not a fugitive per se according to modem case law. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 134 P.3d 962
(Or. App. 2006). In Baker, the defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor and appealed. Id. at
963. During his appeal, he failed to appear at a show cause hearing to pay fmes and costs. Id.
The state then moved to dismiss his appeal on the ground that defendant had absconded and was
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a fugitive from justice. Id. The state had not shown that the defendant had escaped, absconded
from custody or supervision, or otherwise made a conscious effort to evade the trial court's
process. Id The court accordingly dismissed the state's motion to dismiss the appeal. Id; see also
United States v. Gonzalez, 300 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2002) (appellant who did not comply with
conditions of probation was not considered a fugitive).
These courts implicitly found the extremely broad definition of 'fugitive' to be untenable.
This Court should do the same. Ms. Gottlieb has not absconded from justice. She left Idaho for
personal reasons with the knowledge and consent of the prosecution. See Motion to Augment,
AUG. P. 7-12. She is not a 'fugitive' in the ordinary sense. Thus, her appeal should notbe
dismissed on this basis.
B. The fugitive disentitlement doctrine does not apply and therefore the Court should
exercise its discretion to hear Ms. Gottlieb's appeal.

Based on the above, Ms. Gottlieb asserts the State's argument that this appeal should be
dismissed because she is a fugitive and is not entitled to the resources of the appellate process is
misguided. Should this Court find that Ms. Gottlieb is a fugitive, the "fugitive disentitlement"
doctrine is still inapplicable to this case, and thus the Court should exercise its discretion to hear
her appeal.
In Idaho, "[t]he decision whether to dismiss the appeal of a criminal defendant who has
escaped from custody or absconded from probationary supervision is within an appellate court's
sound discretion." State v. Moran-Soto, 150 Idaho 175, 179 (Ct. App. 2010). "An appellate court
may dismiss the appeal of a defendant who is a fugitive from justice during the pendency of his
or her appeal." Id. The rationale for the fugitive dismissal rule is two-fold. Id. "First, any
judgment produced against a fugitive appellant would be unenforceable." Id. And second, "a
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defendant's escape during the pendency of fill appeal essentially amounts to a waiver of the right
to appeal; dismissal discourages escapes and encourages fugitives to surrender." Id.
"Absent some connection between a defendant's fugitive status filld his appeal, as
provided when a defendant is at large during 'the ongoing appellate process,' ... the justifications
advanced for dismissal of fugitives' pending appeals generally will not apply." State v.

Schneider, 126 Idaho 624, 626-27 (1995) (quoting Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 249). "The
necessary 'connection' sought by the Supreme Court in Ortega-Rodriguez, was one where the
defendant's 'former fugitivity was deemed to present an obstacle to orderly appellate process."'

Id at 627 (quoting Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 251). It is a faulty premise to dismiss an
appeal merely "for any act ofjudicial defiance, whether or not it affects the appellate process."

Id
1. The authority on which the State relies is not persuasive.
The state cites several cases in support of its position that Ms. Gottlieb is not entitled to
the appellate process: Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234 (1993), State v.

Schneider, 126 Idaho 624 (1995) (examining State v. Creamer and State v. McKaughten), State
v. Larrea, I 30 Idaho 290 (Ct. App. 1997), and State v. Moran-Soto, 150 Idaho 175, 179 (Ct.
App. 2010). None provides adequate support for the state' s position.
In State v. Schneider, the defendant (Schneider) pled guilty to first degree murder and
was ordered to serve a life sentence. Schneider, 126 Idaho at 626. The court also denied his
motion for reconsideration of the sentence. Id. He then appealed the sentence. Id. After
Schneider had filed an opening brief on appeal, but before the state had filed a responsive brief,
Schneider escaped from the institution where he was being held. Id While Schneider was at
large, the state moved to dismiss his appeal. Id. Schneider was then recaptured within a few days.
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Id. The Court found that Schneider's status as a fugitive did not disrupt the appellate process and
therefore denied the motion to dismiss his appeal. Id. at 627.
In addition, the Schneider court examined two cases cited by the State, State v. Creamer,
No. 13126 and State v. McKaughten, No. 13677, which were unpublished orders from 1980 in
which the Court dismissed the defendants' appeals where the defendants had escaped and
remained at large. Id. at 627. These cases are not particularly helpful, as there are no facts to
compare or distinguish. There has never been any doubt that some escaped fugitives' appeals
may be dismissed.
In State v. Larrea, the defendant (Larrea) was found guilty by a jury on two counts of
felony possession of a controlled substance and one count of misdemeanor possession of a
controlled substance. Larrea, 130 Idaho at 291. Larrea appealed, arguing that she did not receive
effective assistance of counsel. Id The state moved to dismiss her appeal because she absconded
from probation and remained a fugitive from justice. Id The Supreme Court denied the motion
without explanation. Id The state then renewed its motion to dismiss. Id The court contrasted

Schneider and stated that while the defendant, Schneider, was a former fugitive who had been
recaptured after days, Larrea was still a fugitive and her fugitive status had become permanent
because she had not surrendered to the authorities of the state prior to her appeal being submitted
to the Court. Id. at 292. The Court, however, did recognize that it had discretion to hear her appeal
but saw no reason why she would be entitled to the resources of the appellate process. Id.
In Moran-Soto, the defendant (Moran-Soto) was convicted of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver. Moran-Soto, 150 Idaho 175, 178. Moran-Soto appealed his
sentence and was deported six days after his sentencing hearing and weeks prior to the issuance
of his written judgment of conviction. Id. Moran-Soto was required to submit a written report to
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his probation officer every month and to contact the Department of Correction within five days
of his reentry into the United States. Id The probation officer filed a report of probation violation
with the district court claiming that Moran-Soto had been deported and failed to provide a
written report to the officer. Id. This was the basis for the state's claim that Moran-Soto had
absconded from justice and should have had his appeal dismissed. Id The Court of Appeals
found that the district court's probation order contained contradictory terms. Id. at 178. In
addition, Moran-Soto's judgment of conviction, which included his probation terms, was entered
weeks after he had been deported. Id. As such, the court declared that the state had failed to
demonstrate that Moran-Soto was a "fugitive from justice who is disentitled from pursuing his
appeal." Id at 179-80.
Similar to Moran-Soto, Ms. Gottlieb lawfully left the state and did not abscond from
justice. Nothing precluded her from leaving Idaho and the prosecution knew and stipulated to
the removal of her GPS monitoring. See Motion to Augment, AUG. P. 7-12. Unlike Larrea, Ms.
Gottlieb did not abscond from probation, and unlike Schneider, Creamer, and McKaughten, Ms.
Gottlieb did not escape from custody. She left Idaho because she could do so and for a lawful
purpose. In summary, there is no instance of an Idaho appellate court dismissing the appeal of a
defendant who left Idaho prior to sentencing for medical treatment with permission from the
prosecutor, was sentenced in absentia, and subsequently appealed her sentence while remaining
out-of-state for continued medical treatment. Additionally, Ms. Gottlieb's absence does not serve
as an obstacle to the ongoing appellate process. The appeal may proceed now just as it could if
Ms. Gottlieb were present. This Court should adhere to its precedent and exercise its discretion
to hear Ms. Gottlieb's appeal.
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2. An affront to the District Court's sentencing should not result in the appellate court's
dismissal of Ms. Gottlieb's case.

In Ortega-Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court reversed a lower court's dismissal
of an appeal where the defendant was not present for sentencing. In that case, the appellant fled
before sentencing and was recaptured before appeal. Therefore, the Court explained, the
appellant had only "flouted the authority of the District Court, not the Court of Appeals."
Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 246. "The contemptuous disrespect manifested by his flight was
directed at the District Court... " Id. "While a case is pending before the district court, flight can
be deterred with the threat of a wide range of penalties available to the district court judge." Id.
In Ortega-Rodriguez, there was no connection between the appellate process and the defendant's
flight, and the flight occurred during the district court proceedings, and therefore the Court held
that the District Court was the appropriate court to punish the defendant for his flight. Id
The United States Supreme Court recognized that a court should not "sanction by
dismissal any conduct that exhibited disrespect for any aspect of the judicial system, even where
such conduct has no connection to the course of appellate proceedings." Ortega-Rodriguez, 507
U.S. at 246. "Such a rule would sweep far too broadly, permitting, for instance this Court to
dismiss a petition solely because the petitioner absconded for a day during district court
proceedings, or even because the petitioner once violated a condition of parole or probation." Id
The Court continued to explain that when a defendant flees while the case is before a district
court,
[T]he district court is well situated to impose an appropriate punishment. While
an appellate court has access only to the blunderbuss of dismissal, the district
court can tailor a more finely calibrated response. Most obviously, because flight
is a separate offense punishable under the Criminal Code... the district court can
impose a separate sentence that adequately vindicates the public interest in
deterring escape and safeguards the dignity of the court.... Use of the dismissal
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sanction as, in practical effoct, a second punishment for a defendant's flight is
almost certain to produce the kind of disparity in sentencing that the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 and the Sentencing Guidelines were intended to eliminate.

Id at 247-48. In State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712 (2002), the defendant was at large for three years
following a guilty verdict and before imposition of a sentence. The Supreme Court of Idaho
declined to dismiss Nath's appeal, stating:
The affront in this case was to the jurisdiction of the district court. That court had
ample powers to remedy the wrong that occurred, including consideration of the
conduct in imposing sentence. Regardless of the flight, the appellate issues
remained the same. This Court can decide them as well following the flight as
before.

State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 718 (2002); see also State v. Billings, 137 Idaho 827 (Ct. App.
2002) (approving of the Nath rationale and declining to dismiss appeal of defendant who fled the
state while free on bond awaiting sentencing).
In the present matter, Ms. Gottlieb was absent from Idaho before the District Court
rendered its decision. See Motion to Augment, AUG. P. 7-12. Judge Wayman was aware during
sentencing that Ms. Gottlieb was in California with the intent to remain. (Tr p. 11, L 21-23).
Judge Wayman then issued the most restricted sentence and maximum sentence available for a
first-time reckless driving offender, requiring Ms. Gottlieb to serve 180 days injail beginning
Christmas Day. (R p. 46). For this Court to impose the sanction of dismissal now would be to
punish Ms. Gottlieb twice for her move to California which distanced herself from her neighbors
and overall neighborhood dispute at issue in theses matters, a practice that was rebuked by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Ortega-Rodriguez. 507 U.S. at 248.
3. The State and the Court have not suffered any prejudice due to Ms. Gottlieb's
absence.
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Additionally, there is no nexus between Ms. Gottlieb's absence and the ongoing appellate
process as required for dismissal by Ortega-Rodriguez. Ms. Gottlieb is absent from Idaho;
however, she is not absent because ofthe appellate process. Her absence is incidental and
unrelated. Further, the State has suffered no prejudicial effect from Ms. Gottlieb's absence.
Returning to Ortega-Rodriguez, the Supreme Court in that case discussed some ways a
pre-sentencing absence might significantly affect the appellate process. Ortega-Rodriguez, 507
U.S. at 249-50. The Court suggested that a long escape may delay the onset of proceedings so
that the government would be prejudiced in locating witnesses and presenting evidence at retrial
after a successful appeal. In the alternative, the defendant's absence might make a "meaningful
appeal impossible" or "disrupt the appellate process" such that an appellate sanction might be
reasonably imposed. None of these concerns exist in the present matter.
There is no reason for concern that the State will be unable to locate witnesses. Ms.
Gottlieb is not requesting a new trial. Further, the State is not claiming that a meaningful appeal
is not possible here. An example of a case where meaningful appeal is not possible is State v.
Brown, 866 P.2d 1172, 1175 (N.M. 1993) (11-year absence where court reporter destroyed notes

after nine years warranted dismissal); see also Wynne v. State, 831 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. App.
1992) (defendant, by his fugitive status for over 3 1/2 years, was not diligent in prosecuting his
appeal, thereby producing the kind of delay that may be anticipated to cause lost items, such as
loss of portion ofrecord in defendant's case); Com. v. Johnson, 764 A.2d 1094 (Pa. Super.
2000) (defendant not entitled to new trial where fact that trial transcript is unavailable was direct
result of defendant's status as fugitive for 10 years). No such circumstances exist here. Nor is Ms.
Gottlieb' s absence disruptive of the appellate process in any way, as may be the case where a
defendant is absent during a co-defendant's appeal and therefore processing of the appeal would
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require a duplicate effort by the appellate court. In short, the rationales for dismissal under
Ortega-Rodriguez do not apply, and therefore dismissal is improper.

4. The equities weigh in Ms. Gottlieb's favor.
"Fugitive disentitlement" is an equitable doctrine. See United States v. Gonzalez, 300
F .3d 1048, 1051. The Supreme Court has held that although the "need to redress the indignity
visited upon the District Court by [a fugitive's] absence from [aJ criminal proceeding, and the
need to deter flight from criminal prosecution" were substantial interests, disentitlement was ''too
blunt an instrument for advancing them" and too harsh a sanction. United States v. Degen, 517

US. 820,828 (1996). The equities in this case weigh in Ms. Gottlieb's favor due to her voluntary
absence from the state prior to sentencing, her continued participation in this matter through
counsel, and her desire to distance herself from the complaining party to this case. Her move to
California should not operate as a forfeiture of her right to appeal. To deprive Ms. Gottlieb of
her access to the appellate process in these circumstances would be a disproportionately harsh
sanction and would require a substantial departure from Idaho's established precedent.

II.

The District Court abused its discretion when sentencing Ms. Gottlieb.

The State argues Ms. Gottlieb should be treated differently and more severely serving the
maximum possible sentence because of her" ... unwillingness to follow court orders, and the need
to protect society." (Respondent's Briefp. 9). The State attempts to bolster this argument referring
to representations made by the aggrieved parties, Ms. Slayton and Mr. Maughan, claiming Ms.
Gottlieb " ...violated protection orders with impunity". (Respondent's Brief p. 10). However, the
State does not provide evidence beyond these statements made at the sentencing hearing. The
State does not provide prior police reports, prior case numbers, prior investigations, or prior
complaints, which one would expect to see if violations occurred. It has long been recognized the
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first offender should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal. State v. Nice,
103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394 402 (1953) (overruled on other grounds in
State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 229 (1971). The record in this case is uncontroverted, Ms.

Gottlieb had never been charged.with a crime prior to May 21, 2018, nor was she charged with
any new allegation thereafter. The comments of Ms. Slayton and Mr. Maughan are inaccurate,
thus tainting the State's argument.
Imposing the harshest possible penalty of a first-time offender may be an abuse of
discretion. State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (Ct. App. 1998). In Hoskins, a first-time offender
plead guilty to two counts of drawing a check without funds, Idaho Code§ 18-3106(a). Id at 672.
The district court sentenced the man to the maximum term of confinement for each count of
drawing a check without funds, three (3) years each, and further ordered the sentences be served
consecutively. Id. However, the district court suspended the sentence and placed the man on
probation. Id. When the man violated his probation and the judge imposed the six (6) year sentence,
the Court of appeals held the imposition of a six (6) year consecutive sentence for a fist-time
offender was too harsh and modified the sentence to run concurrently for a fixed period of three
(3) years. Id. at 673.
Ms. Gottlieb, a first-time offender, plead guilty to reckless driving. (R p. 46). Like the
district court who sentenced a defendant to serve a maximum term of confinement for each count
of drawing checks without funds in Hoskins, the District Court in this case sentenced Ms. Gottlieb
to the maximum term of confinement for reckless driving. (Tr. P. 15 L. 2-4). Unlike the district
court suspending sentence and placing the man on probation in Hoskins, the District Court refused
to place Ms. Gottlieb on probation and told her to report to jail on Christmas Day.
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A court may not simply find a sentence of incarceration appropriate for "protection of the
public" as the state argues. (Respondent's Brief p. 11). Idaho law contemplates that a court "shall
deal with a person" first without imposing sentencing and only if after considering the nature and
circumstances of the crime, the history, character and condition of the defendant, imprisonment is
the "appropriate" way to protect the public. Idaho Code§ 19-2521(1).
The District Court contrary to Idaho Code § 19-2521(1) only conducted a partial analysis
of the statute in its entirety. The district court improperly ignored the requirement to " ...deal with
a person who has been convicted of a crime without imposing sentence of imprisonment.. . " never
once stating the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of
the defendant was such that probation was wholly inappropriate and the only remedy
imprisonment. The only rationale the District Court provided for not imposing probation is Ms.
Gottlieb does not have " ... a substance abuse issue or mental health issue ... ". (Tr. p. 14 L. 24-25).
Similarly, the district ignored and did not consider any of the applicable mitigating grounds within
Idaho Code§ 19-2521(2) when making its decision. The District Court solely relied on protection
of the public and deterrence for Ms. Gottlieb, directly against the form and effect of Idaho Code §
19-2521, imposing an unreasonable, punitive, and improper sentence.
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Conclusion

Ms. Gottlieb is not a fugitive according to an ordinary understanding of that word. Even
if this Court considers Ms. Gottlieb a fugitive, the Court should exercise its discretion to hear her
appeal because the "fugitive disentitlement" doctrine does not apply. Moreover, the abuse of
discretion in the District Court's sentencing is discemable on the record before this Court. As
such, the decision must be reversed and remanded with guidelines for revised sentencing.

DATED this

30th

day of August, 2019.
AMENDOLA DOTY & BRUMLEY, PLLC
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
By:

/c/ Craig W. Zanetti
Craig W. Zanetti
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Motion to Stay Sentence and Brief in Support to be served by the method indicated below on the
following:
Lori A. Fleming
Deputy Attorney General
ecf@ag.idaho.gov
/c/ Craig W. Zanetti
Craig W. Zanetti
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